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PLEADING WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS

PLEADING WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS
IN CHANCERY BILLS
Webster H. Burke*

I.
IN GENERAL

growing complexity of the provisions of the
modern trust deed, combined with the great number
of notes or bonds with interest coupons thereto attached, often secured by a single trust deed, makes this
subject an important one to the solicitor who is called on
to foreclose. He must sufficiently plead in his bill of
complaint the written documents on which it is based to
secure to his client the full benefit thereof. On the other
hand, practical considerations, as well as the frequent
desirability of haste in instituting suit, which means haste
in drafting the bill, forbid that he do more than is necessary from the standpoint of safety. The present day
practitioner occupies a far different economic position as
to the disposition of his time and that of his office assistants than did his professional forefathers. With this
situation in view, and with special reference to the practice in the State of Illinois, a common law jurisdiction,
where no statute or local rule of court applies, this subject is now considered. It is obvious that there are but
four ways in which documents can be pleaded in bills in
chancery, viz: in haec verba; in substance only; in substance only with an exact copy thereof attached to the
bill as an exhibit and thereby made a part thereof; and in
substance only and by apt reference thereto the document
itself made a part thereof.
HE
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II.
IN HAEC VERBA
That the practice in the English courts of Chancery
at an early date was to set forth all writtten documents
in full where the same were relied upon and even probably in instances where the document itself was not material to complainant's case, is evidenced by the rules
that were early adopted to correct this abuse. The ordinance of Lord Bacon against impertinence was doubtless directed in part at least against this practice. He
declared that both the party and the counsel under
whose hand pleading of immoderate length had passed,
should be fined. Lord Keeper Coventry, with the advice
of Sir Julius Caesar, the Master of the Rolls, in the year
A. D. 1635, ordained that bills, answers and other chancery pleadings "should not be stuffed with the repetitions
of deeds or writings in haec verba, but the effect and substance of so much of them only as was pertinent and material to be set down, and that in brief and effectual
terms, etc., and upon any default therein, the party and
counsel under whose hand it passed, should pay the
charge of the copy and be further punished as the case
should merit."
The same rule was re-enacted by the Lords Commissioners in the year A.D. 1649 and in Lord Clarendon's
Digest or System of Rules (Vane's Orders 2569 and
165) and that these rules were not entirely effective, at
least in the American Colonies we can infer from the
fact that in the year A.D., 1727, the Governor of the
Colony of New York, exercising in Council the powers
of the Court of Chancery, appointed five commissioners
as a committee to consider and report as to methods of
correcting existing abuses in Courts of Chancery. In
their report they found it necessary to refer to the unfortunate existence of this form of impertinence in
Chancery bills filed in the courts of the Colony. Thereafter, in the year 1820, Chancellor Kent in the case of
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Hood v. Inman, 4 Johns Ch. (N. Y.), 437, in referring
to the pleading of a power of attorney in haec verba in
the answer, where the substance of it was accurately
stated in the bill, held it to be impertinent saying "The
objection to the unnecessary folia may be taken on the
taxation of costs."
There can be no question that, except in the instance
where the document relied upon is very brief and the
exact language thereof of the very gist of the cause of
action itself, the setting forth of the same in the bill in
extenso is not only an offense against good form in
pleading but such an offense as, on exception, should be
held to be impertinence. There has been no substantial
change in the law in American jurisdictions since Chancellor Kent spoke in the year 1820.
III.
IN SUBSTANCE ONLY

It is fundamental that the pleader must set forth in
his bill all of the ultimate material facts which go to
constitute his cause of action and that having done so
he is required to do no more by the general rules of
Chancery pleading. This situation is modified of course
in jurisdictions where statutes or local rules of court
provide that written instruments should be filed with the
pleading. As, for instance, in Art. 16, Par. 120 of the
Code of Maryland which is based upon the 4th equity
rule, it is provided "that no order for process shall be
made or issued upon any bill, petition or other paper
until such bill, petition or other paper, together with all
the exhibits referred to as parts thereof, be actually
filed with the Clerk of the Court. See Beachey v.
Heiple, 130 Md., 683, 101A, 553; Henderson v. Harper,
127 Md., 429, 96 A., 550; Ann, Cas. 1917 C. 93;
Peabody v. George's Creek Coal, Etc. Co., 120 Md.,
659, 87A. 1097; Nagen Gast v. Alz. 93 Md., 522, 49A.
333; Chappell v. Clarke, 92 Md., 98, 48A. 36; Baltimore v. Coates, 85 Md., 531, 37 A. 18.
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In Tennessee, the rule is the same except that the
written documents upon which complainant's cause of
action is based may be produced on order of the chancellor after the bill is filed and the bill itself is not demurrable because the same are not filed therewith.
Carter v. Chattanooga (Ch. A.T. 48 S.W. 117).
There is much to be said in favor of this method of
pleading because in the first place it lays no additional
burden upon the pleader. Good form and safety require
that he at least set forth in substance the written document relied upon in his bill even though he may thereafter attach the same as an exhibit. The only danger is
one which arises from failure to completely and accurately allege all that is material.
IV.
IN

SUBSTANCE ONLY WITH EXHIBIT ATTACHED

This method for many years has been the common
practice in the United States though there is little evidence that the same ever became general in England.
There has been, however, some difference of opinion as
to the relative weight and consideration to be given to
the exhibit in comparison with that to be attached to the
bill itself. Some authorities have held that the attaching of the exhibit does not dispense with the usual allegations as to the substance of the document in the pleading, while others have held that the attaching of the
exhibit practically excuses the pleader from any more
than formal reference to the document in the bill.
Among the courts adhering to the first view we find
again several shades of opinion, where a variance occurs.
Some jurisdictions hold that the allegations of the bill
control, but the majority hold that in such case the
provisions of the exhibit are controlling.
In Caton v. Willis, 40 N. C. 336 the Court says "Exhibits do not make a part of the bill but are a part of the
proof and cannot aid defective statements in the bill any
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more than any other part of the proof." While there
are other similar decisions, notably in Missouri, Pomeroy v. Fullerton, 113 Mo. 440, 21 S. W. 19; Tesson v.
Tesson, 11 Mo. 274 and in Texas, Guadalupe v. Johnston, 1 Tex. Civ. A 713, this is not the general rule.
There are so many statements in the decisions to the
effect that an exhibit properly attached to a bill in chancery becomes a part thereof so that a defect in the allegations of the bill concerning the substance of the document exhibited will be cured by the exhibit that no attempt will be made here to quote from any decisions on
this subject other than those of the State of Illinois.
In Moore v. Titman, 33 Ill. 357, the court said in
reference to the contention of the appellant that the
execution and delivery of the deed of mortgage relied
upon was not sufficiently alleged in the bill: "The instrument is referred to as an exhibit which has the same
effect as if copied at large into the bill. The court will
refer to the exhibit to see if it sufficiently appears to
have been so executed."
In Brunner v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 100 Ill.
App., 22, the court said: "We are of the opinion that
when a document is referred to in the bill as an exhibit
and attached thereto, and the whole bill shows that complainant treats it as a part thereof, it should also be
treated by the court as a part of the bill," citing Daniell's
Chy P1. and Prac. 367; Brown v. Redwyne, 16 Ga. 67;
Howard Mfg. Co. v. Water Lot Co., 53 Ga. 689.
That Illinois is one of the states whose courts regard
the exhibit as controlling, rather than the allegations of
the bill, concerning the document exhibited, is established by many cases. In Benneson v. Savage, 130 Ill.
352, Mr. Justice Scofield said, "It is objected that the contract described in the bill and that described in the trust
deed are not the same, and that therefore the trust deed
is not a security for the contract described in the bill. A
copy of the trust deed is made part of the bill as an
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exhibit, and it is therefore unimportant, even if it would
be conceded that the pleader misconceived its legal
effect, for the instrument itself being thus before us, we
will give it that legal effect to which it is entitled," citing
as authority Allen v. Woodruff, 96 Ill., 11. To the
same effect is National Park Bank of New York v.
Halle, 31 I1.17.
For many years cautious pleaders in this jurisdiction
have insisted upon attaching as exhibits to bills filed complete and accurate copies of written documents relied
upon. The objection to the practice is not that it is unsafe but that it frequently entails a large amount of
mechanical work. In foreclosures of large bond issues
this practice may be quite burdensome.
V.
IN

SUBSTANCE

ONLY WITH

By APT

INCORPORATION

REFERENCE

In England after the adoption of the ordinances hereinbefore referred to, making it no longer proper or permissible to set forth written documents in extenso in
pleadings filed in Chancery, the practice developed at an
early day of setting them forth in substance, and by
sufficient reference to the document itself for purposes
of identification, making it in express terms a part of the
pleading. 1 Daniell Ch. Br. P. 475.
As early as 1820, in Hood v. Inman, supra, Chancellor Kent referred with approval to the report of the
special commissioners appearing at the end of Bradford's Edition of the Colony Laws of New York, in
which it is said that it is sufficient after making a statement of the substance of certain deeds, in order that the
pleader may have the benefit of said deeds, for him to
conclude "as by the deeds ready to be produced will appear."
There are other later American authorities to the
same effect.
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In Swetland v. Swetland, 3 Mich. 482, the court said:
"By referring in a bill to an instrument 'as in and by said Indenture (reference being thereunto had) when produced will
more fully and at large appear' the whole document referred to
is made a part of the record."
They further held that though not fully nor accurately
set forth in the bill complainant might at the hearing
avail himself of such portions as are not recited as well
as such portions as are inaccurately set forth.
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in the case of
Eskridge v. Brown et al., 208 Ala. 210 (94 So. 353) in
commenting on the situation where the bill recites after
describing the existence of a certain conveyance which is
relied upon by the pleader: "Said conveyance is recorded
in the office of the Judge of Probate of Marengo
County, Alabama, in Deed Book, volume TT, page 253
et. seq., and which said conveyance is hereby referred to
and with leave of the court made a part of this bill of
complaint, the same as though it was here set forth in
full, and with leave of reference thereby as often as may
be necessary," that the conveyances alleged in the bill
were sufficiently averred. It is not clear in the foregoing
case whether the court holds the averment of the written
document to be sufficient on account of the allegations as
to the substance thereof found in the bill, or because of
the method of incorporation by reference thereto which
is adopted by the pleader. A fair inference, however, is
that some weight at least was attached to the document
itself on account of its incorporation by reference.
It should be noted in this connection that the same
court in Jones v. Caraway, reported in 87 So. 820,
where the bill did not set forth the substance of a mortgage sought to be declared void but merely stated the
book and page in which same was recorded and said, "To
which reference is hereto made" held this to be wholly
inadequate to make the mortgage a part of the bill.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Martin v.
McBryde, 38 N. C. (3 Ir. Eq.) 531, said that where a
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bill refers to an instrument which is relied upon without
setting forth the contents thereof, or having annexed
thereto a copy is bad on demurrer. In this connection
it should be noted, however, that the uniform ruling of
this court is that it is necessary, not only to set forth the
written instrument relied upon in substance, but if the
same is material to complainants' cause of action, to
attach also a copy of it to the bill as an exhibit.
One of the most favorable cases from the standpoint
of this practice is that of Loewenstein v. Rapp, 67 Ill.
App. 678. This was a bill to foreclose a trust deed
upon certain premises in Cook County, Illinois. The
pleader failed to set forth in his bill any of the provisions of the trust deed having to do with the payment of
the taxes by the legal holder of the notes secured thereby or the allowance of solicitors' fees in the event of
foreclosure, but the trust deed, although a copy thereof
was not attached to the bill, was made part of the bill
by reference thereto. Mr. Justice Waterman, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The allegations of
the bill regarding the trust deed were sufficient to make
the trust deed a part of the bill. * * * In stating deeds or
other written instruments in a bill, it is usual to refer to
the instrument itself, in some such words as the following, namely: 'as by the said indenture, when produced,
will appear'. The effect of such reference is to make
the whole instrument referred to a part of the record.
The effect of referring to it is to enable the plaintiff to
rely upon every part of the instrument and to prevent
his being precluded from availing himself at the hearing of any portion, either of its recital or operative part,
which may not be inserted in the bill. Thus it seems
that a plaintiff may by his bill state simply the date and
general purport of any particular deed or instrument
under which he claims and that such statement, provided it is accompanied by a reference to the deed itself,
will be sufficient." The Supreme Court of Illinois con-
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sidered this practice in Jocelyn v. White, 201 Ill. 16.
The bill sought to foreclose a principal note secured by
trust deed conveying real property. An attempt was
made to set forth the instruments sued upon in substance
only and to incorporate them by reference without attaching copies thereof to the bill as exhibits. The pleader
failed, however, to properly set forth the substance of
the trust deed. A demurrer to the bill on the ground
that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action was overuled by the trial court. The cause was
then brought by writ of error to the Appellate Court
which affirmed the decree of the Circuit Court in Jocelyn
v. White 98 Ill. App. 50. The errors relied upon by these
defendants when the case was brought to the Supreme
Court are in part as follows: "(a) that copies of the
notes and mortgage sued on were not attached to the bill
or set out in haec verba in the bill; (b) ...... ; (c) that
there is on allegation in the bill of any condition in the
mortgage or notes authorizing the holder of the notes to
accelerate the maturity of the indebtedness by declaring
the same due before maturity; ...... " After some discussion of the practice in this respect in the state of Illinois and elsewhere the court said, in part, "...... .we
understand the rule to be, that if the complainant in the
bill relies upon a written instrument, and has so described
the instrument as to identify it, and then by apt words
specifically refers to the instrument, he may, if demurrer
be not interposed, upon the trial of the cause have the
benefit of the instrument and all its provisions, but that
if the bill, on its face and in apt terms, does not contain
all the allegations necessary to show him to be entitled
to the relief prayed, the bill will be obnoxious to demurrer, but if the bill be not demurred to, but be answered
or default made, and the instrument so referred to, when
offered in evidence, shows the right of the plaintiff to his
relief, then in such case the bill will be sufficient to support the decree." Upon this and other grounds the Su-
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preme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate
Court and the decree of the Circuit Court and remanded
the cause to the Circuit Court of Cook County for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion.
It cannot be contended in view of the foregoing decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois, that such a
practice would insure to the pleader all of the benefits
which might accrue to him in the event that he had
attached the document relied upon to his bill as an exhibit. On the other hand, however, it does not appear
from the authorities that the practice of incorporating the written instrument by reference only, after seting forth the substance thereof in the bill itself, is improper or is not as beneficial to the pleader as the more
cumbersome method. The authorities in other states
holding that such a practice is improper, or that exhibits
must be attached to the bill, are for the most part based
upon local statutes or rules of court which modify the
original chancery practice. There can be no doubt that
if the substance of the written instrument is properly
pleaded in the bill there can be no necessity in this state
of attaching exhibits. It seems therefore a reasonable
conclusion that where the bill contains sufficient allegations as to the substance, and where the documents relied
upon are of such length that their incorporation as exhibits would be onerous, distinct advantage might be attained by making them a part of the bill by apt reference thereto without attaching copies as exhibits.

